is claimed to be based upon 'scientific' evaluations of human motivations, has prompted critical responses. One of the most persistent criticisms of utilitarian approaches to punishment concern the relationship that is drawn by some commentators between the trade-off of 'pain' and 'pleasure'. This criticism is particularly directed toward a 'rule utilitarian' perspective, as opposed to an 'act utilitarian' perspective that trusts the rational choices of individual agents to produce 'best consequences'-though some scholars contend that the resort to personal moral values, as shaped by the subjective inclinations of society, make the introduction of these guiding principles into a utilitarian approach to public policy inescapable.
Arguably, calculations of actual outcomes on the part of 'reasonable' and 'wellinformed' individual agents are displaced by a subjective and, often, unsubstantiated anticipation of possible outcomes, making the imposition, by the state, of a rule-based system designed to produce predictable outcomes an inescapable requirement of a general utilitarian approach. 8 This rule utilitarian approach is instrumentally oriented and attempts to arrive at a systemic arrangement of maximum good through institutional means that are imposed upon society. Conceivably, it is argued (though Bentham never explicitly makes this claim) that this utilitarian approach to penal law would tolerate the possibility of punishing an innocent person if the effect (in terms of promoting deterrence or increasing public feelings of security) produces a greater 'good'. 9 Indeed, it is argued that the utilitarian conceivably would approve of the punishment of a person who is known to be innocent as a calculated imposition of 'pain' to achieve a greater social 'pleasure'. 10 Nonetheless, the feasibility and desirability of an 'act utilitarian' approach to human behavior and social control arguably would not produce better results. That perspective contends that the reasonable capacity of individual agents to engage in a moral calculation of whether an action would yield as much 'net utility' as any alternative action.
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Another criticism leveled against the utilitarian approach to punishment (especially in terms of its seeming emphasis upon deterrence as a prime goal of penal policy) is its lack of a persuasive normative moral standard to counter the claims made by a retributivist approach. The argument that punishment is a response to a social judgment about the offense committed toward the individual victim or the community (particularly in terms of desert) can be a powerful one, especially on an emotional level. Communitarian defenses of retributive penal policies can be particularly ardent in this respect. 12 The contrast of crime retribution with the utilitarian emphasis upon crime reduction and its seemingly sterile calculations can make that utilitarian argument seem (especially from a communitarian perspective) unappealing, even if it is more satisfying from a purely intellectual position. Reconciling competing 'pleasures' is the key to public policy. A logical conclusion can be drawn, in this respect, concerning the ideal goal of utilitarian philosophy. This conclusion could be reached, analogously, through an external, non-utilitarian philosophical appeal to the ancient Platonic conceptualization of 'forms'. This unarticulated suggestion of the theoretical possibility of an abstract, ideal utilitarian society, free from any punishment, is, admittedly, unattainable in the 'real' world of Plato's 'shadows'. But it is attainable to the philosopher as a rationally conceived 'form' that serves as a measurement of relative success or failure to achieve certain values. Plato's normative quest for an ideal republic that cannot be experienced but only perceived through a superior application of reason, offers a potentially appropriate model for understanding Bentham's apparent, though unstated, allusion to this modern version of an unattainable philosophical and political goal, especially as revealed through the 'metaphor of the cave'. 40 Hypothetically, a state that can promote pleasure in a manner that avoids ever imposing pain arguably offers a similar standard for evaluating the ultimate ethical appropriateness of all penal actions of government.
Arguably, this approach to the interpretation of utilitarianism also offers a potential Aristotelian dimension. 'Pleasure' can be identified as the ultimate end, or telos, of a modern government. If the utilitarian conceptualization of a state's telos is the promotion of pleasure, then the best possible government is one that achieves that end as perfectly as possible, thus avoiding the imposition of any pain. Even if no state is capable of attaining that abstract end, perfectly, it can be judged to be better than another state if it can promote the pleasure of society through the application of less pain than another state can achieve, consistent with an Aristotelian approach.
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The state that advances the pleasure of a crime-free society while imposing the least possible pain through punishment is, therefore, superior to the state that achieves a similar result but inflicts a greater proportion of punishment.
Penal law rests upon the assumption that certain persons will seek their particular 'pleasures' in a manner that will inflict various types of 'pain' upon other persons and, indirectly, upon the general society. It also assumes that the only effective way to eliminate the 'pain' that these persons will inflict in the course of this pursuit of their own criminal 'pleasure' is for that government to counter that 'pain'
with its own infliction of penal 'pain'. Because inflicting 'pain' is, theoretically, anathema to the government that faithfully observes the utilitarian model, it is an action that is made necessary only because failure to inflict that 'pain' upon the criminal will result in even greater 'pain' to that person's victims and the general well-being of society. Punishment is, therefore, a 'necessary' yet 'undesirable' 'evil' because it imposes 'pain', ironically, as a means of eliminating 'pain' and, thus, increasing the capacity for the greatest number of persons to pursue 'pleasure'. Consequently, the logical result of this utilitarian conceptualization of penal law and policy is an approach that is both constrained and absolutely reluctant. If punishment is, indeed, 'evil', then the ability of the state to advance pleasure for society without any recourse to it at all constitutes an ideal-perhaps, even, a 'moral' ideal. That approach arguably constitutes, in turn, a Platonic 'form' or, perhaps, even a pre-Socratic notion of an ultimate 'virtue', signified by the ideal of archē (a concept that also is conceived as an appeal to 'first principles') from which all other moral concepts can be derived. 43 These themes of 'constraint' and 'reluctance' lie, by implication, at the core of the utilitarian principle of proportionality of punishment, even though it is not explicitly identified or acknowledged in those terms. Ideally, no punishment should be inflicted upon anyone. If, however, that ideal is unattainable, then only the absolute least amount of 'pain' (in the form of punishment) must be imposed in order to achieve the greater pleasure that this action seeks to achieve. In that way, the 'pain' of punishment becomes proportional to the 'pleasure' that it produces: minimal 'pain' results in 'maximum pleasure so the utilitarian ideal is realized. 44 Bentham distinguished different types of 'pleasure' and assigned a hierarchy of preferential status regarding them. Interestingly, this approach appears to deviate from the more rigidly empirical emphasis that generally defines utilitarian thought.
Rather than relying upon the initial ontological premise that all humans avoid pain and seek pleasure, regardless of qualitative differences in defining the conditions that 
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This last category can be most significant. Bentham noted that the public desire to advance its 'pleasure' in terms of strict proportionality might not be precisely attainable. Bentham acknowledged that 'an error on the minimum side', in this respect, constitutes the 'greatest danger' because it would render a punishment ineffective. 47 But Bentham then minimized the likelihood that this error will occur.
Thus it appears that it is the possibility of punishing too severely that actually constituted, for him, the outcome that should be most carefully avoided. 48 So it can be argued that the lack of strict proportionality ought to favor, from Bentham's perspective, the offender-again implying not just a pragmatic concern but suggesting that the pain of punishment must be avoided as much as possible, if not
entirely.
An error on the maximum side [of punishment], on the contrary, is that to which the legislators and men in general are naturally inclinedantipathy, or a want of compassion for individuals who are represented as dangerous or vile, pushes them onward to an undue severity. It is on this side, therefore, that we should take the most precautions, as on this side there has been shewn [sic] the greatest disposition to err. 49 Despite his pragmatic calculations, Bentham displayed a tendency to minimize punishment that suggests the possibility of characterizing this area of law and public policy as truly constituting an intrinsic, rather than merely an instrumental, evil. Granted, a few utilitarian commentators also have used the term 'intrinsic evil' in reference to the general concept of punishment. However, their actual application of the concept generally has been directed toward a description its instrumental or extrinsic effect. 50 They have not treated it as an evil in itself.
Conclusion
Of course, it is far from clear that Bentham contemplated the possibility of regarding punishment as a truly intrinsic evil. But it may be extremely useful to 'tease' such an understanding out of his analysis, especially as it is presented within The Rationale of Punishment. That understanding could overcome the unfortunatelypersistent and misplaced criticism that a utilitarian scheme of penal law and policy regards punishment as merely a competing form of pain and an instrument to maximize pleasure that could justify the punishment of an innocent person. That conclusion clearly seems to be contrary to the spirit of this book and Bentham's entire intent regarding the reform of penal law. Despite reevaluations in this area, the commitment of Bentham, James Mill, and other early utilitarians, in particular, to the cause of penal reform and the elimination of a vindictive and harsh political environment regarding law and punishment is well established, even if subject to some criticism and modification. 51 Furthermore, this understanding could provide a clearer standard. By establishing the intrinsic evil of punishment as a means of using its complete elimination as the ideal against which all penal law and policy can be measured, the proper proportionality of specific acts of punishment can be more readily evaluated. If punishment is intrinsically evil (so that it should be avoided as much as absolutely possible), then the imposition of any punishment can be assessed in terms of whether or not a lesser punishment can achieve the same effect. Also, this approach could gain the moral advantage that retributivist approaches to punishment enjoy in terms of an appeal to a higher ethical ideal (punishment as an absolute evil) that can counter subjective claims that punishment is a moral consequence of desert.
Utilitarian critiques of penal law and policy would not be perceived, from this perspective, as calculations of sterile, rationally-derived trade-offs of relative causes and consequences of pain and pleasure. Instead, utilitarianism can gain the dimension of appealing to a (admittedly utopian) desire to attain a higher goal (akin to a Platonic form) in which all pleasure can be advanced and all pain can be abolished.
Therefore, from this vantage, proportionality is not only a guideline but an imperfect consequence of an inability to achieve a perfect standard by avoiding the imposition of an intrinsic 'evil' as much as possible. Potentially, the philosophical implications of this approach could be instructive and the policy implications could be considerable.
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